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Missed Opportunities: Psychological Ramifications of 
Counterfactual Thought in Midlife Women 
Janet Landman, 1,4 Elizabeth A. Vandewater, 2 Abigail J. Stewart, 1 and Janet E. Malley 3 
Counterfactual thinking entails the process of imagining alternatives to reality--what might 
have been. The present study examines the frequency, content, and emotional and cognitive 
concomitants of counterfactual thinking about past missed opportunities in midlife women. 
At age 43, nearly two-thirds of the sample of educated adult women reported having missed 
certain opportunities at some time in their lives. Most of the counterfactual thoughts con- 
cerned missed opportunities for greater challenge in work. Emotional distress at age 33 did 
not predict later counterfactual thought. Instead, counterfactual thinking at age 43 was as- 
sociated with concurrent emotional distress. However, acknowledging counterfactual thinking 
about the past was also associated with envisioning ways to change things for the better in 
the future. This suggests the possibility that the negative appraisal often entailed in coun- 
terfactual thinking may be associated with emotional distress in the short run but with mo- 
tivational benefits in the long run, at least for middle-aged women. 
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I think I don't regret a single "excess" of my respon- 
sive youth--I only regret, in my chilled age, certain 
occasions and possibilities I didn't embrace. 
Henry James 
INTRODUCTION 
Possible but unactualized states, or alternatives to 
reality, are called counterfactuals, thinking about 
counterfactuals  is called counterfactual  thought 
(Goodman,  1973; Kahneman  & Tversky, 1982a; 
Kripke, 1980; Lewis, 1973). In the passage quoted 
above, Henry James is engaging in counterfactual 
thought about chances of which he had not made the 
most. Whenever we wonder what we would do if we 
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won the lottery or what would have happened had we 
taken one job rather than another or lived somewhere 
else, we are engaging in counterfactual thought. Be- 
cause choice is inescapable and insofar as conflict 
among choices, claims, or ways of life is inevitable, hu- 
man beings will probably always wonder what might 
have been had we embraced those other occasions and 
possibilities (Hampshire, 1983). In the present study, 
we examined the frequency and content of counter- 
factual thoughts about missed opportunities in midlife 
women. We also examined the relationship between 
counterfactual thought and past and present emo- 
tional distress as well as the relationship between 
counterfactual thoughts about the past and the future. 
Although a relatively new area for systematic 
empirical inquiry, counterfactual thought has already 
been implicated in a variety of psychological proc- 
esses, including causal attribution (Gavanski & Wells, 
1989; Wells & Gavanski, 1989), self-esteem (Roese 
& Olson, 1993), emotional reactions to life events 
(Davis, Lehman,  Wortman, Silver, & Thompson,  
1995; Gleicher et al., 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982a, Landman, 1987; Landman, 1995; Lehman, 
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Wortman, & Williams, 1987), social perception (Mac- 
rae, 1992; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1990; 
Roese & Olson, 1995), and motivation (Johnson & 
Sherman, 1990; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & 
McMullen, 1993; Ruvolo & Markus, 1992). 
With the exception of the work on possible 
selves by Markus and Nurius (1986) as well as that 
on personally relevant counterfactual thought by 
Landman and Manis (1992) and very recently by 
Davis et al. (1995), virtually all the research targeting 
counteffactual thought to date has been carried out 
in the laboratory,  typically employing wri t ten 
vignettes describing hypothetical decision makers, 
events, and outcomes. Therefore, many questions re- 
main about the nature and implications of personal 
counterfactual thought. 
Markus and Nurius' (1986) notion of "possible 
selves," or cognitive/affective representations of the 
self in some currently unactualized state, highlights 
the personal nature of some counterfactual thought. 
In the language of possible self theory, someone 
might imagine, for example, currently unactualized 
past and future possible selves of a shy teenager and 
MacArthur awardee, respectively. Such self-relevant 
counterfactual thinking has important emotional and 
behavioral implications. Counterfactual  thought 
about oneself and one's life is likely to be especially 
significant in middle age when many life commit- 
ments have been made, but when there is still time 
to make major changes in them (see, e.g., Helson, 
Mitchell, & Hart, 1985; Levinson, 1978). 
Incidence of Counterfactual Thought 
Although the question of the frequency of per- 
sonal counterfactual thinking has received little or no 
attention, there have been previous attempts to 
measure people's regrets. Regret is surely a cousin 
of counterfactual thought, as implied by James in the 
passage quoted above. Indeed, regret has been re- 
ferred to as a "counteffactual emotion," the affective 
counterpart of counterfactual thought (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982b). 
A. 1953 Gallup poll (Erskine, 1973) asked a na- 
tional sample of men and women the following ques- 
tion: "Generally speaking, if you could live your life 
over again, would you live it in much the same way 
as you have, or would you live it differently? If dif- 
ferently: What would you do differently?" This ques- 
tion, which was intended to measure regret, actually 
does not directly inqu.ire about regret, defined as a 
rather painful cognitive/affective state of feeling sorry 
about, in this case, one's life choices (Landman, 
1993). It is conceivable that people might wonder 
what would have happened had they done something 
else, while experiencing little or no regret. 
This seems to be the case with a character in a 
recent short story by Barnett (cited by Wolitzer, 1990, 
p. 17): "I don't have any regrets, but sometimes I 
wonder if you had come to New York when I asked 
you to, if things would be different now." Conversely, 
regret need not entail the thought that one would 
do something differently, a point illustrated by Taylor 
(1985, p. 99): 
She [an employer] may regret an  action (sacking an 
employee) which overaU she still considers necessary 
and beneficial.... It is possible also to regret an ac- 
tion but accept it [i.e., not  wish to do it differently 
or to undo it] under  the same description: she re- 
grets sacking the employee because the girl [sic] was 
so easily crushed, but  she had to be sacked, never- 
theless, because she was so inefficient. 
It seems likely that regret will frequently accompany 
counterfactual thought. However, all we know for 
sure about the "What-would-you-do-differently?" 
question is that, to answer it, one must engage in the 
cognitive process of imagining what might have been 
done differently, that is, counteffactual thought. 
Essentially the same question as that fix-st posed 
in the 1953 Gallup poll was asked again in 1965 of 
another national sample (Erskine, 1973), in the early 
1980s of three diverse samples (Landman & Manis, 
I992), and in 1989 of a sample of over 300 adults 
(Kinnier & Metha, 1989) and of a sample of educated 
adult women (Metha, Kinnier, & McWhirter, 1989). 
Although quite diverse in time and samples, most of 
the previous surveys found an overall incidence of 
counterfactual thought in the 35 to 65% range (35% 
in the 1953 Gallup poll; 54% in the Landman and 
Manis sample of adult men and women; 64% in the 
1965 Gallup poll). Education has consistently proved 
to be the single most common area for counteffactual 
thought in previous research. Educational counterfac- 
tuals were mentioned by 15 and 12%, respectively, of 
the men and women in the 1953 Gallup poll, by 39% 
of the Kinnier and Metha (1989) sample, by 43% of 
the 1965 Gallup sample, and by 69% of the all-women 
sample queried by Landman and Manis (1992). After 
educational might-have-beens, career and marital de- 
cisions produced the next most common might-have- 
beens in all previous studies. 
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Counterfactual Thought and Emotional Experience 
Personally relevant counterfactual thought could 
conceivably be related to emotional experience in a 
number of ways. One possibility is that negative emo- 
tion may evoke later counterfactual thought (espe- 
cially about negative life outcomes and events), as 
depression appears to give rise to negative thinking 
(Beck, 1982). Or it could be that counterfactual 
thought evokes negative emotion. A third possibility 
is that negative emotion and counterfactual thought 
are not causally related, but may simply be associated 
with one another. Whatever the specific nature of the 
relationship, a number of avenues of research suggest 
that counterfactual thought and negative emotion 
will go hand in hand. 
The mood congruence literature finds better re- 
trieval of negative life events among those in nega- 
tive moods than among those in neutral or positive 
moods (see reviews by Blaney, 1986; Eich, 1989; Isen, 
1984). In fact, mood congruence effects are stronger 
for autobiographical than laboratory material (Teas- 
dale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 
1980). It could be then that those who are chronically 
emotionally distressed may generate more counter- 
factual thought. 
The line of research on depressive realism finds 
that those who clear-sightedly avow personal short- 
comings and unpleasant realities also show distress- 
ing emotions, particularly depression (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979, 1982; Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, 
& Barton, 1980). Imagining better alternatives to re- 
ality may prove to be another cognitive path to dis- 
tressing emotion (Cohen & Lazarus, 1979; Kuhl, 
1981; Taylor, 1983; Taylor & Brown, 1988). People 
who report a lot of negative past selves also tend to 
suffer a lot of negative affect (Markus & Nurius, 
1986). By extension, these bodies of research point 
to the possible psychic costs--at least in the short 
run--of counteffactual thought concerning negative 
life realities. 
Counterfactual Thought About the Past and the 
Future 
"Set yourself free from the paralysis of analysis," 
commanded one self-help book (Price, 1979). From 
this perspective, thinking too much about the past is 
assumed to produce immobilization. There is some 
merit to this idea. Excessive counterfactual thought 
might prove excessively demoralizing. Counterfactual 
thinking could conceivably even supplant future-ori- 
ented thoughts and goals, leaving one bogged down 
in the "slough of the past." 
On the other hand, counterfactual thinking, 
even in the face of missed opportunities or other mis- 
fortunes, may not be in principle paralyzing. Refusing 
to think about the past and its might-have-beens, 
though superficially progressive, could actually serve 
to keep us stuck in the past. One thinks here, of 
course, of Santayana's adage: "Those who cannot re- 
member the past are cond6mned to repeat it." In 
contrast, those who are able to sustain their mental 
connection with the past could be in a better position 
to imagine alternative possible worlds and selves and 
eventually to take action to free themselves from an 
unsatisfactory past. Imagining how things might have 
been different might stimulate thoughts and feelings 
that form a bridge between the past and the future. 
Like pain, counterfactual thought about a regrettable 
past may serve instructional and motivational pur- 
poses-telling us that something is wrong and mov- 
ing us to do something about it. 
Though there is, to our knowledge, no empirical 
evidence directly relevant to the question of how 
thinking about past missed opportunities might relate 
to future-oriented thoughts and action, certain ave- 
nues of theory and research indirectly bear on the 
question. First, those working from a psychodynamic 
perspective have stressed the importance of acknow- 
ledging and integrating negative personal experi- 
ences to the end of unfixating those who were fixated 
and unparalyzing those who were paralyzed (Erikson, 
1963; Freud, 1917/1963). An implication of this body 
of thought is that temporary demoralization may be 
the price of long-term well-being. 
Second, recent social psychological research 
finds that imagining a future behavior can bring 
about behavior that actually changes the future. Gre- 
gory, Cialdini, and Carpenter (1982) found that peo- 
ple who were induced to imagine enjoying cable TV 
were later more likely than those who did not engage 
in this act of imagination to get cable. Sherman, 
Skov, Hervitz, and Stock (1981) found that subjects 
who had been induced to imagine and explain their 
own successes or failures on a future anagram task 
actually performed differentially in self-fulfilling, 
prophecy-like directions (see also Johnson & Sher- 
man, 1990). 
More directly relevant to the question at hand 
is the work of Ruvolo and Markus (1992), who had 
90 Landman, Vandewater, Stewart, and Malley 
subjects generate positive or negative possible selves 
by imagining themselves succeeding or failing at a 
task. The type of possible selves they imagined sig- 
nificantly affected their persistence at a task. Finally, 
Markman et al. (1993) have posited that the process 
of imagining better possible worlds serves the moti- 
vational function of "prepar[ing] one for the future" 
(p. 87). 
Counterfactual Thinking in Women 
Especially when what might have been is tanta- 
lizingly easy to imagine or when reality fails to com- 
pare  favorably with what  "might  have been"  
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986), counterfactual thinking 
may prove to be the rule. Both these circumstances 
apply to the lives of many modern women. The al- 
ternative to the decision to work only at home is un- 
doubtedly easier to imagine for women today than 
for women in the past. Further, the ever-present con- 
flict between relational imperatives and the necessity 
and/or desire for work in the public domain provides 
fertile soil for counterfactual thought. For example, 
a world that presses women (and less often men) to 
choose between staying home with a sick child and 
keeping a job is a world primed to evoke counter- 
factual thought. In general, insofar as women's lives 
are beset with role change, role strain, constraint, 
and incommensurable choice, counterfactual thought 
will probably be very much a part of their inner lives. 
That women do seem to experience a good deal 
of counterfactual thought is supported by the results 
of the previous research on regret that targeted 
women or reported women's results separately from 
men's. The all-women sample studied by Landman 
and Manis (1992) showed high rates of personally 
relevant counterfactual thought, with 69 percent of 
the 1145 respondents reporting educational counter- 
factuals, 61% career-related counterfactuals, 40% 
marital counterfactuals, and 37% parenting counter- 
factuals. The incidence of educational counterfactuals 
(called "regrets" in that and most other studies) was 
38% among the women in the Metha et al. sample 
(1989). Other, less frequent counterfactuals included 
imagining having been more assertive, more self-dis- 
ciplined, or more risk-taking (reported by 25, 16, and 
15%, respectively, of the women of the Metha et al. 
sample). Sears (1979) found that a sample of women 
identified early in life as gifted reported counterfac- 
tual thoughts regarding their family/work choices later 
in their 60s. Whereas 41% of this sample of women 
described themselves as having been primarily home- 
makers, in their 608 only 29% said they would make 
the same choice if they had it to do over again. In 
contrast, although 30% of the same sample reported 
having worked at a "career" during most of their 
adult lives, even more (37%) later said they would 
choose that pattern if they could choose over again. 
In general, Sears found that many women entertained 
thoughts of having pursued a career throughout their 
adult lives or except when raising small children, 
rather than having worked in a noncareer job (for in- 
come only) or as a homemaker. 
The present study then addresses the following 
questions. How common an experience is the gen- 
eration of personal counterfactuals--specifically, 
thoughts about missed opportunities--in educated 
women early in middle age? What sorts of as-yet-un- 
realized possibilities are these women most likely to 
imagine? How is this form of counterfactual thought 
related to past and present emotional distress? Fi- 
nally, how is counterfactual thinking about the past 
related to counterfactual thinking about the future? 
The present research addresses these issues through 




The sample was part of a group of 186 adult 
women who graduated from an elite women's college 
in 1964 and who responded to questionnaires as a 
part of a larger longitudinal study of women's lives 
(Stewart, 1975, 1978, 1980). For the purposes of 
these analyses, data from two waves are of interest: 
responses to questionnaires mailed in 1976 (N = 96) 
and in 1986 (N = 102). The questionnaires con- 
cerned respondents' familial, educational, and occu- 
pational experiences,  at t i tudes,  and values. In 
addition, respondents were asked questions about 
their missed opportunities and hopes and wishes for 
the future, and they were administered measures of 
affect. These data provided information about the in- 
cidence, content, and emotional and cognitive con- 
comitants of counterfactual thinking among these 
women. 
The respondents were about 33 years old in 1976 
and 43 in 1986. Ninety percent of these women had 
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been married 5 at some time in their Iives; of these, 
34% had been divorced at least once. Most (79%) of 
the respondents were employed outside the home by 
the time they were 43. This sample was quite well edu- 
cated: By 43 years of age, 45% had attained doctoral- 
level degrees, 27% had attained master's degrees, and 
the remaining 28% had attained bachelor's degrees. 
Finally, this sample was financially well off, with 47% 
at age 43 (i.e., in 1986) reporting a total family income 
level of $75,000 or more, 32% reporting a total family 
income level of $35,000 to $74,000, and the remaining 
21% reporting a total family income of $10,000 to 
$34,000. The high levels of educational and socioeco- 
nomic position of this sample made it a particularly 
interesting one with which to examine these questions, 
as the respondents presumably had a lot of choices 
and opportunities potentially to replay. 
Measures and Procedures 
The form of counterfactual thought assessed was 
missed opportunities, which were measured in 1986 
by this question: "Were there any attractive oppor- 
tunities for career or other long-range activities 
which you did not pursue?" A yes/no response for- 
mat was used. In addition, respondents who an- 
swered yes were asked to describe their missed 
opportunities. The missed opportunities fell into the 
categories of education, close interpersonal relation- 
ships, parenting, career, leisure, and self (average in- 
terrater agreement = 95%). 
The relationships between personally relevant 
counterfactual thought and emotional distress were 
also examined. Depression and anxiety at ages 33 and 
43 were measured by the Zung (1965) self-rating 
scales. In this measure, subjects are asked to rate 
symptom items such as loss of appetite, feeling down- 
hearted and blue, and constipation (for depression) 
and feeling nervous, panicky, and having shaking 
hands (for anxiety) on a 4-point scale ranging from 
never to nearly all the time. Depression and anxiety 
scores were created for each subject by averaging their 
answers on the 20 and 15 items making up each scale, 
respectively. These scores were then standardized, with 
the mean set at 0 and the standard deviation at 1. The 
5These data, which were originally gathered in 1974, provided no 
information on the issue of  sexual orientation. Naturally, inas- 
much as sexual orientation is not an either/or matter and is not 
static over the life course, marital status is not a substitute for 
knowledge of  sexual orientation. 
emotion scores ranged from -0.68 to 2.89 for anxiety 
and from -1.62 to 3.21 for depression. 
Finally, the relationship between counterfactual 
thoughts about the past and the future was explored. 
Future hopes were measured by respondents' answers 
to this open-ended question, which appeared in a dif- 
ferent section of the questionnaire than the missed- 
opportunities question: "If you could do anything you 
wished in the next ten years, what would you do?" 
The responses fell into five categories: career, inter- 
personal (a combination of marital- and friend-re- 
lated plans), parenting, lifestyle (e.g., plans to slow 
down, to travel more), and self-related hopes (with 
interrater agreement ranging from 88% to 96%). 
RESULTS 
Frequency and Content of Counterfactual 
Thoughts 
As Table I shows, 64% of the 95 respondents 
reported that there were opportunities that they had 
not pursued. The mean number of missed opportu- 
nities listed was .95, with a range of 0 to 4. 
Among the responses to the question about past 
missed opportunities were the following: (a) A pro- 
fessor reported that she had given up her idea to 
start a women's clothing store/chain in favor of a de- 
cision to take the "tamer academic/professional 
path"; (b) a poet wrote about having declined invi- 
tations to do readings, workshops, and conferences 
Table L Percentage of Missed Opportunities 
Reported in Different Domains ~ 
Missed opportunities 








aThe columns do not sum to 100% because the 
life domains are not mutually exclusive; re- 
spondents reported counterfactual thoughts in 
more than one domain. 
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because she had been "just plain scared"; (c) a phy- 
sician wrote about having forgone the Peace Corps 
because she was accepted into medical school; and 
(d) many wrote about not having completed their 
educational goals sooner. 
Most of the counterfactual thinking (63% of the 
sample) focused on careers. Missed opportunities 
concerning education were also common (mentioned 
by 41% of the sample). Very small proportions of this 
sample reported missed opportunities concerning 
parenting, self, and leisure; and no one reported 
missed opportunities related to close interpersonal 
relationships (marriage and friendships). 
Of those who reported at least one missed op- 
portunity in the career domain, 85% felt they had 
missed a chance for a career offering greater chal- 
lenge; the remaining 15% described having missed 
an opportunity for an earlier career. Of those who 
reported missed educational opportunities, 68% felt 
that they had missed a chance for more education, 
24% felt that they had missed a chance for a differ- 
ent sort of education, and 8% felt that they had 
missed a chance to complete their education earlier. 
Emotional Distress and Counterfactual Thought 
As the modal number of missed opportunities 
listed by those respondents who listed any was 1, the 
sample was divided into two groups: those who re- 
ported at least one missed opportunity (n = 61) and 
those who reported none (n = 34). The following 
analyses examined to what extent these two groups 
differed in emotional state prior to or concurrent with 
their responses to the missed-opportunity question. 
The levels of depression and anxiety at age 33 
were not related to acknowledgment of missed op- 
portunities at age 43 [depression t (1, 53) = .363, 
n.s.; anxiety t [1, 53) = .297, n.s.]. 
Concurrent depression and anxiety were signifi- 
cantly related to reporting missed opportunities: de- 
pression [t (1, 90) = 6.72, p < .01], anxiety [t (1, 90) 
= 6.74,p < .01]. However, mood scores at age 33 were 
also significantly and highly correlated with mood 
scores at age 43: depression at age 33 with depres- 
sion a't age 43, r = .64, p < .001; anxiety at age 33 
with anxiety at age 43, r =.69, p < .001. In order to 
examine the relations between counterfactual think- 
ing and later mood (age 43) independent of prior 
mood, the prior mood scores were treated as a co- 
variate in the relevant analyses (ANCOVAs). That 
is, depression at age 33 was the covariate in all analy- 
ses with depression at age 43, and so on. 
As shown in Table II, even when prior mood was 
controlled for, those who reported missed opportu- 
nities at age 43 had significantly higher levels of con- 
current depression than those who did not, F (1, 53) 
= 5.38, p < .05. They also reported significantly 
higher levels of concurrent anxiety, F (1, 53) = 7.69, 
p < .01. 
Counterfactual Thinking about the Past and the 
Future 
Reported thoughts about the future included 
matters like the following: (a) career ambitions, such 
as obtaining tenure or a higher-level management 
job, finishing a book, designing and carrying out a 
specific piece of research, increasing the profitability 
of one's company, and "collecting a mess of grants"; 
(b) lifestyle hopes, such as moving to California, trav- 
eling more, and reading more novels; and (c) inter- 
personal hopes like spending more time with one's 
partner and friends. 
Compared with those who reported no counter- 
factual thoughts about the past, those who did report 
such thoughts were significantly more likely to spec- 
ify wishes to change something about their future 
fife, t (1, 83) = 2.24, p < .05. When the domains 
were examined separately, three approached signifi- 
cant relationships with counteffactual thought: career 
[t (1, 83) = 1.7, p = .09], lifestyle It (1, 83) = 1.9, 
p = .07], and the interpersonal domain It (1, 83) = 
1.7, p = .10]. See Table III. 
Table II. Past and Present Emotional States by Connterfactual 
Thought* 
Mean emotion score by group 
Some missed No missed 
Emotional states opportunities opportunities 
Age 33 
Depression -.049 -.122 
Anxiety -.047 -.145 
Age 43 
Depression -.080 a -.38% 
Anxiety .156 a -.384 b 
aCell entries for age 43 are standardized means adjusted for prior 
mood at age 33. Higher scores represent more of the particular 
dysphoric emotion. Within each row, means with different sub- 
scripts differ significantly. 
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Table HI. Hopes for the Future by Counterfactual Thought 
Mean number of hopes for the 
future by group 
Some 
missed No missed 
Life domain opportunities opportunities t p 
Total hopes .269 .182 2.2 .03 
Career hopes .497 .322 1.7 .09 
Lifestyle hopes .276 .173 1.9 .07 
Interpersonal hopes .191 .083 1.7 .10 
DISCUSSION 
Frequency and Content of Counterfactual Thought 
Counterfactual thinking clearly is not limited to 
the laboratory, but occurs in response to real-life, 
personal choices as well. Thoughts of not having 
made the most of one's chances were quite com- 
monly reported in this sample in the domains of 
work and education, but not in other areas of life 
(close interpersonal relationships, parenting, leisure, 
self). The overall  incidence of counterfactual  
thoughts about the past observed in this sample 
(64%) is identical to that observed in the 1965 Gal- 
lup survey of men and women as well as similar to 
that (54%) observed in the sample of adult men and 
women who were asked a comparably generic ques- 
tion in the Landman and Manis (1992) study. The 
high incidence of thoughts about past missed oppor- 
tunities probably reflects the nature of life for such 
well-educated individuals in the prosperous period 
between the 1960s and 1990s: that is, the period fre- 
quently did offer a greater number of attractive op- 
tions than individuals were able to choose. 
Counterfactual thoughts concerning careers 
were the most common of all such thoughts among 
the present sample. The rate of career counterfactu- 
als in the present study (43% of the sample) is nearly 
identical to that observed in the sample most com- 
parable to the present one--the academically tal- 
ented women of the Sears (1979) sample, in which 
48% said they would change some aspect of their 
earlier home/career choices. Interestingly, the most 
common thoughts about missed opportunities in the 
present study had to do with chances for a more chal- 
lenging career. It will be important to find out 
whether this pattern, reminiscent of the frequent re- 
gret for having avoided risk observed in Kinnier and 
Metha's (1989) research, generalizes beyond these 
three samples, all of which were highly educated. 
The incidence of career-related counterfactuals 
in the present sample is, however, far higher than 
that observed in the 1953 Gallup poll, where only 
3% of the women polled then said they would make 
different career decisions if they could live their lives 
over. Cohort effects offer a possible explanation for 
this difference. Relative to the Gallup sample of 
women responding in the early 1950s, the present 
group, responding in the 1980s, encountered a very 
different social climate with respect to norms con- 
cerning working women. The women in the Gallup 
sample were queried before the women's movement. 
In contrast, the present sample came of age at the 
beginning of the women's movement and were que- 
ried in its wake, a social factor that might be ex- 
pected to influence both their career histories and 
their later counterfactual thinking about their career 
decisions--in the direction observed. 
All other surveys have found educational coun- 
teffactuals to be the most common counterfactuals 
and they were the second most common counterfac- 
tuals reported in the present study. One plausible 
reason for the difference is the very high educational 
attainment of the present  sample. It would be 
astonishing for a group in which almost half earned 
doctoral degrees and another 27% masters degrees 
to report a preponderance of educational missed op- 
portunities. However, the relatively high reported in- 
cidence of career - re la ted  counte r fac tua l s  and 
relatively low incidence of other types of counteffac- 
tuals in the present sample may also be partially due 
to measurement differences. Whereas previous sam- 
ples were asked a general question (e.g., "If you had 
your life to live over, what, if anything, would you 
do differently?"), the present respondents were 
asked a more specific question (i.e., "Were there any 
attractive opportunities for career or other long- 
range activities which you did not pursue?"). The ca- 
reer focus of this question undoubtedly contributed 
to the respondents' focus on their careers. 
Probably the most obvious question arising from 
this study is whether these results are limited to one 
developmental stage. We anticipated that midlife 
would provide a good point for studying the assess- 
ment of past commitments at a time of life when it 
is still possible to make changes. It will be valuable 
to ascertain whether this midlife counterfactual proc- 
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ess is, in fact, different from the processes that young 
adults engage in when imagining alternative futures 
for themselves in the absence of constraining com- 
mitments as well as those that older adults engage 
in when reflecting on past commitments without the 
possibility of future change. 
It is also important to consider whether these 
results generalize to men or to other individuals in 
different life circumstances. We think it likely that 
men and other women in similar circumstances will 
show a similar overall rate of counterfactual thought, 
but not necessarily similar patterns on the specific 
areas of life ta rge ted  by these counterfactual  
thoughts. Our expectation of generalizability with re- 
spect to overall incidence is based on the following 
types of evidence: (a) The overall rate of counter- 
factual thinking observed in the present sample was 
identical to that observed in the national survey of 
men and women that was conducted by Gallup in 
1965 and not far from that observed in a completely 
different sample of men and women studied by 
Landman and Manis (1992); and (b) the available 
studies of regret do not find gender differences in 
its overall incidence (Chin, 1993; Erskine, 1973; Kin- 
nier & Metha, 1989; Shimanoff, 1985). However, for 
the reasons discussed above, other samples may be 
expected to differ in the incidence of domain-specific 
counterfactual thought. Besides age, other demo- 
graphic features such as level of education and social 
class might also affect the incidence of counterfactual 
thinking. Surely for people with fewer educational, 
occupational, and financial resources, counterfactual 
thought about missed opportunities might differ in 
frequency, in content, and in psychological ramifica- 
tions. 
It is also possible that the incidence of other 
types of counterfactual thoughts may differ from that 
for thoughts about unseized opportunities. If so, this 
may explain some of the differences in the frequency 
of counterfactual thought observed between the pre- 
sent study and previous research that explored the 
more general "If I had it to do over" type of coun- 
terfactual thinking. For example, counterfactual 
thoughts about major life decisions may prove less 
common than counterfactual thoughts about specific 
missed'opportunities. This is conceivable on a couple 
of counts. First, the process of reconsidering one's 
major life decisions may be a more difficult cognitive 
task than that of recalling missed opportunities. Con- 
struction is undoubtedly  harder  than retrieval 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986). In addition, questioning 
a major life decision requires one to undo mentally 
a significant portion of one's personal history; but 
thinking of forgone opportunities often requires one 
to undo only a single event (or non-event). Thinking 
about forgone opportunities may, therefore, prove to 
be the more common form of counterfactual thought 
because it is both cognitively and emotionally easier 
to do. 
Counterfactual Thought and Emotional Distress, 
Past and Present 
The present study does not support the idea that 
it is chronic or dispositional emotional distress that 
produces later counterfactual thought. However, hav- 
ing counterfactual thoughts does appear to be asso- 
ciated with higher levels of depression and anxiety 
at the same age, even when the earlier emotional 
state is controlled for. This suggests that the depres- 
sive realism phenomenon may apply not only to judg- 
ments about reality but also to thoughts about what 
might have been. An alternative explanation is mood 
congruence effects: It may be that, compared with 
those in happier emotional states, those in more 
dysphoric moods retrieve from memory more of the 
negative life events that missed opportunities repre- 
sent. An experimental design will be necessary to de- 
termine which mechanism be t t e r  explains the 
observed relationship. 
Again, it will be important to find out whether 
the unpleasant emotional concomitants of coun- 
terfactual thought also show up before and after 
middle age. There may be a cumulative effect of 
counterfactual thinking (and the losses and limita- 
tions of life that presumably evoke it) so that it is 
not until middle age that it adds up to significant 
emotional distress. How the level of emotional dis- 
tress experienced during middle age (when some 
change is still possible) over counterfactual thinking 
compares to that experienced in old age (when the 
possibility of most change is foreclosed) is still an 
open question. 
Counterfactual Thought About the Past and the 
Future 
It appears that, compared with those who report 
no such counterfactuals, those who acknowledge 
thoughts of past missed opportunities are more likely 
to envision future changes in their lives. Taken to- 
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gether, the observed relationships between counter- 
factual thought and emotion and between counter- 
factual thought about the past and the future suggest 
some intriguing possibilities. For one thing, those in- 
dividuals with stable propensities toward counterfac- 
tual thinking, such as that third of Markus and 
Nurius's (1986) subjects who thought about negative 
past selves all or almost all the time, may turn out 
to be at risk for chronic emotional distress. 
However, it is conceivable that those who es- 
chew counterfactual thought may also be at risk. 
Johnson and Sherman (1990, p. 510) expressed the 
idea well: "Without considering alternatives to real- 
ity, we must accept the past as having been inevitable 
and must believe that the future will be no different 
from the past." Conversely, thoughts about what 
might have been may point to a way out of an un- 
satisfactory past or present. They may, for example, 
mobilize action to seek out or make better use of 
available opportunities--which could in turn enhance 
one's life and thus one's psychological well-being 
over the long run. Those individuals who engage in 
counterfactual thought, followed by intentions to 
take steps to improve their future, may actually make 
changes that in turn stave off a continuing state of 
emotional distress. Such a pattern would follow from 
the research that finds a strong relation between 
thoughts or intentions and behavior (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1980; Gregory et al., 1982; Ruvolo & Markus, 
1992; Sherman et al., 1981). In accordance with the 
thinking of clinical psychology, social cognition the- 
ory, and recent research on counterfactual thinking 
(Markman et al., 1993), the process of actively en- 
tertaining counterfactual thoughts may have a moti- 
vating function. 
Counterfactual thoughts probably will not serve 
to improve the future if these thoughts about the fu- 
ture amount merely to fuzzy wishes and wildly unre- 
alistic pipe dreams. However, most of the future- 
oriented counterfactual thoughts generated by the 
present respondents appeared reasonably concrete 
and realistic: for example, to finish a book, design 
and carry out a specific piece of research, travel and 
read more, and "be respected in my community." In- 
terestingly enough, some of the respondents gave evi- 
dence of being aware of this distinction, unprompted. 
One listed five sets of wishes for her future, starting 
with "to win the lottery, be rich and be able to sleep 
till noon daily, travel, and spend a lot of time at the 
beach" and ending with "read a lot (this one I'll get 
to do)." With this last comment, she wryly showed 
her awareness of the difference between improbable 
fantasies and real possibilities. Another individual as- 
signed a number of 1, 2, or 3 to each of her thoughts 
about the future, explaining that 1 designated possi- 
ble, 2 unlikely, and 3 very unlikely wishes. Still, even 
those she had marked 3 were not all that farfetched 
for the successful physician that she was: "help form, 
develop, run a psychosomatic/internal medicine 
training program," and "run a clothing store." 
Though counterfactual thoughts about one's future 
may not always end in people's actually realizing 
those thoughts, certainly in the absence of such 
thoughts people are unlikely to make changes for the 
future. 
If the hypothesized mobilizing effects of coun- 
terfactual thoughts prove valid, it may also be that 
the process of generating counterfactuals enhances 
emotional well-being--in the long run--after the oc- 
casion for the unpleasant emotion has been removed 
or changed for the bet ter - -or  (failing that) after 
one's mourning has been worked through (Freud, 
1917/1963). Thus, the negative appraisal often en- 
tailed in counterfactual thinking, though associated 
with dysphoric emotion in the short run, may turn 
out to be beneficial in the long run. If, with further 
research, this proves to be the case, it wilt represent 
significant evidence of what has aptly been called 
"the power of backward thinking" (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986, p. 137). 
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